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ABSTRACT:  This study uses data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality to 
examine variation in tenant association participation among public housing tenants in 
Boston and Los Angeles.  Using logistic regression models we estimate the net effects of 
four sets of factors on the likelihood that a tenant has attended tenant association 
meetings: neighborhood attachments, grievances, resources and constraints, and feelings 
of efficacy.  Results show that net of other factors, participation is greater among attached 
tenants who have resided in public housing longer and who have social ties to other 
people.  Grievances also increase participation, but they do so indirectly by increasing 
people’s tendency to be more involved in their communities.  With the exception of 
education’s positive effect, resources and constraints are not important determinants of 
participation.  Education and efficacy act like enablers increasing people’s ability to be 
involved in their communities.  The implications of the findings for research and 
community organizing are explored by examining how three mechanisms account for the 
findings.      
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There is a large and burgeoning body of literature on the causes and consequences 
of civic participation in America (Cunningham & Kotler, 1983; Fukuyama, 1995; Hipp, 
2002; Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Murphy & Cunningham, 2003; Olsen, Perlstadt, 
Fonseca, & Hogan, 1989; Putnam, 2000, 2002; Rankin & Quane, 2000; Small, 2002; 
Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Wuthnow, 1998).  One focus in this literature has 
been on participation in neighborhood associations.  This study attempts to extend our 
understanding of neighborhood association participation by looking at a type of 
participation within an important and often ignored subpopulation–public housing 
residents.  Drawing from the literature on civic participation and collective action we 
identify four sets of factors that could account for variation among public housing tenants 
in their participation in tenant associations: neighborhood attachments, grievances, 
resources and constraints, and efficacy.  We extend prior research by looking not only at 
which factors account for variation in tenant association participation but also how 
specific factors affect such participation.  Using data from the Multi-City Study of Urban 
Inequality (MCSUI) collected in the early 1990s, we test our theoretically informed 
expectations about the importance of these factors.  
By focusing on participation of public housing tenants, we hope not only to 
extend our understanding of civic participation and the social organization of high-
poverty urban neighborhoods but also to contribute to debates about policy initiatives that 
emphasize tenant participation as a key element of public housing management.  Given 
that tenant participation is viewed from a policy perspective as important and beneficial 
in financial and social terms, and that from a practical standpoint is more difficult to do 
than often assumed (Conway, 2001, 2003; Hula & Hall, 1994; Koebel & Cavell, 1995; 
Knox, Kolton, & Dwarshuis, 1974; Peterman, 1996), it is important to increase our 
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understanding of its variation.  Knowledge of the factors that predict participation in 
tenant associations is an initial first step in helping public housing staff and community 
agencies design and implement better policies that target socially isolated tenants, the so-
called hard core poor who might not normally participate nor be recruited to participate 
in the first place (Feldman & Stall, 2004; Kingston, Mitchell, Florin, & Stevenson, 1999; 
Kramer, 1967, 1969; Reingold, 1997; Reingold, Van Ryzin, & Ronda, 2001; Venkatesh, 
1997).  
DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION 
There are many causes of tenant association participation among public housing 
tenants.  Based upon our review of the literature on public housing and more general 
work on civic participation and collective action, we focus this study on four sets of 
factors that we think could cause variation in participation: neighborhood attachments, 
grievances, resources and constraints, and efficacy.  Our interest, however, is not just in 
whether these factors are important determinants of tenant association participation, but 
also how they affect such participation.  We believe that there are three important 
mechanisms through which a factor can affect tenant association participation.  First, a 
factor may increase or decrease a person’s ability to be involved in their community.  For 
various reasons, some people are more involved in a variety of civic organizations and, as 
a result are more likely to be involved in their tenant association.  We refer to this 
mechanism as the global participation mechanism.  Second, a factor may not affect 
overall participation in civic organizations but only participation in specific types such as 
tenant associations.  As discussed below, we expect these factors will pertain more to the 
specific domain of the tenant association.  We will refer to this mechanism as the local 
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participation mechanism. Together these two mechanisms imply that there is often a two-
step process leading to participation in particular civic organizations like tenant 
organizations.  First, various factors increase the likelihood that an individual will get 
involved in some civic organization.  Then possibly other factors affect the probability 
that an individual will get involved in a specific organization such as their tenant 
association.   For example, those with more grievances may be more likely to get 
involved in their community in a variety of ways in order to address their grievances, 
while neighborhood attachment through social ties and longevity may increase the odds 
of getting involved in their tenant or neighborhood association. 
The third mechanism highlights the importance of social ties.  As discussed 
below, past research has found that social ties to other people are an important 
determinant of civic participation.  Because of the centrality of social ties and networks 
for participation, we expect that other factors could impact tenant association 
participation through their association with social ties.  We refer to this mechanism as the 
social network mechanism. 
In what follows we discuss each of the four sets of determinants of tenant 
association participation and which mechanisms we think are responsible for the 
anticipated effects. 
Neighborhood Attachment 
A number of scholars have emphasized the importance of attachments to others 
through social ties as a determinant of participation (Ahlbrandt & Cunningham, 1979; 
Granovetter, 1985; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Oliver, 1984; Smith, 1994) though the 
actual reasons why social ties affect participation are debated. Different studies lead to 
different conclusions about the importance of ties in predicting civic participation.  The 
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standard argument is that social ties increase participation because the more people 
someone knows, the more likely they are to know someone who participates in a civic 
organization and, therefore, the more likely they are to be asked by those people to 
participate (Ahlbrandt & Cunningham, 1979; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Smith, 1994; 
Wilson & Musick, 1997).    
We also know from previous studies that the number of social ties an individual 
has is related to how long they have resided in a particular locale (Rankin & Quane, 
2000). Because the development of social ties is a time-intensive activity, those who have 
been residents for a longer period of time should have more ties, and conversely, newer 
residents would be expected to have fewer social ties.  In turn, people who are long-term 
residents are more likely to participate in a neighborhood organization because they have 
more of an investment in and attachment to their neighborhood, increasing the likelihood 
that they will be aware of opportunities for community participation (Kasarda & 
Janowitz, 1974; Rankin & Quane, 2000; Rohe & Stegman, 1994; Sampson, 1988).  On 
the other hand, in neighborhoods with high population turnover and weak levels of 
attachment, it is more difficult for tenants to become acquainted with others and to 
develop friendship networks through which information about community participation 
can flow (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997).  
Reingold (1995) found a positive association between civic participation and 
social networks in his study of community participation in Chicago public housing.  He 
found that civic participation is influenced by how many people one knows in one’s 
neighborhood and this depends in part on whether or not one has children. Olsen, 
Perlstadt, Fonseca, and Hogan’s (1989) study in Lansing, Michigan, found that their 
measures of neighborhood attachment, including having ties to other people in one’s 
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neighborhood and length of residency, were positively associated with neighborhood 
association participation.   
Some research suggests that the location of one’s ties is an important factor to 
consider.  Orepesa (1992), for instance, found that people with friends both in and outside 
of one’s neighborhood are more likely to participate in neighborhood improvement 
associations than residents with few local social ties.  He also found that the effect of 
length of residency on participation in neighborhood improvement associations is not 
always linear–for residents that had lived up to six years in the neighborhood it had a 
positive effect but for residents who had lived six years or more in the neighborhood, 
they were less likely to participate than more recent tenants. 
Finally, though Oliver (1984) does not look at the determinants of participation, 
her analysis of the factors that differentiate token from active participants in 
neighborhood organizations indicates that social ties are important.  She found that active 
participants have more neighborhood-based social ties and more education. In addition, 
activists seem to participate more because they believe that other people are unlikely to 
do so.      
Based on prior research we expect that both social ties and length of residence 
will be positively related to tenant association participation, though we also expect that 
the way in which social ties and longevity affect participation will vary.  As past research 
has shown, it is important to distinguish between people who have more social ties in 
general and people who have social ties to those in their neighborhood.  Both local ties to 
people in one’s neighborhood and length of residence should affect tenant association 
participation through the local participation mechanism.  Of all the factors that we look 
at, these two factors are most related to the domain in which tenant associations operate–
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the local neighborhood and those who reside within it.  Local ties increase a person’s 
exposure to people who are likely to recruit them into the tenant association.  Longevity 
increases attachment to a place, awareness of opportunities to participate, and interests in 
issues related to the local community. 
   On the other hand, the global participation mechanism should account for the 
effect of the overall number of social ties on tenant association participation.  People with 
larger social networks are more likely to be involved citizens and because of their greater 
tendency to get involved, more likely to participate in their tenant association.  Therefore, 
we expect: 
H1:  Persons with social ties to neighbors will be more likely to participate in 
their tenant association than those without ties to neighbors.   This effect of 
neighborhood ties should persist even after controlling for variation among people 
in their overall tendency to participate in civic organizations. 
 
H2:  The more social ties a person has the more likely they are to participate in 
their tenant association.  However, after controlling for variation in the tendency 
to participate in civic organizations, the net effect of social ties should be 
substantially reduced.  This is because we expect that social ties affect tenant 
association participation through their effect on global participation. 
 
H3:   The longer a person has lived at his or her current residence the more likely 
they are to participate in their tenant association.   This effect of longevity should 
persist even after controlling for variation among people in their overall tendency 
to participate in civic organizations. 
 
Grievances 
One important reason why people participate in tenant associations and more 
generally in collective actions is because they have grievances (Oropesa, 1992; Taube & 
Levin, 1971; Tilly, 1978; Venkatesh, 2000).  A grievance exists when a person or group 
perceives their current situation or social conditions to be at odds with their expectations 
or with the values of their society.  One way people can reduce the gap between 
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expectations and reality is by participating in civic organizations like neighborhood 
associations.  Grievances are typically directed towards a delimited target such as a 
governmental agency and often stem from some incident or threat (Opp, 1988).  
Prior research has found that grievances are not as important as one would think.  
Olsen et al. (1989) in their study of neighborhood associations looked at the relative 
importance of neighborhood cohesion, community satisfaction, perceived neighborhood 
problems, perceived effectiveness of neighborhood organizations, perceived community 
problems, participation in political organizations, and demographic characteristics in 
predicting neighborhood association participation. They found that variation in most 
grievances about neighborhood problems were not associated with neighborhood 
association participation and those that were, were only weakly associated with it (Olsen 
et al., 1989).   
It is also possible that the effect of grievances on participation is the result of 
other factors.  For example, Rohe and Stegman (1994) found that grievances about 
neighborhood problems are positively related to developing ties with one’s neighbors.   
The more one knows one’s neighbors the more likely one is to become aware of 
neighborhood problems and to participate in neighborhood organizations.   
The limited importance of grievances in past research may be due to complex 
ways in which grievances are related to participation.  We suspect that three mechanisms 
are at work.  First, complaints about local problems such as neighborhood upkeep and 
safety should lead to participation in neighborhood or tenant associations (the local 
participation mechanism).  Second, the accumulation of a wide range of grievances about 
such things as schools and bank lending should lead people to be more active in civic 
organizations within the larger community.  In turn, that community activism should 
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increase the odds of them participating in their local tenant association (the global 
participation mechanism).  
Finally, the network mechanism is likely to be important because of the 
association of networks (and longevity) with grievances.  Those who have been around 
longer may be more aware of problems.  Contacts with others may amplify grievances, 
and grievances may lead people to have more social ties as they come into contact with 
others who share their grievances.  As such the effects of grievances on civic 
participation may be in part a social network effect.  Either grievances affect participation 
by increasing social ties or the association of grievances with participation is the result of 
both grievances and participation increasing with more social ties (and length of 
residency). 
As such we have three hypotheses concerning grievances: 
H4:  The more local grievances a person has, the more likely they are to 
participate in their tenant association.  This effect of local grievances should 
persist even after controlling for variation among people in their tendency to 
participate in civic organizations. 
 
H5: The more grievances a person has, the more likely they are to participate in 
their tenant association.  However, after controlling for variation in the tendency 
to participate in civic organizations, the net effect of the accumulation of 
grievances should be substantially reduced.  This is because we expect that 
grievances affect tenant association participation through their effect on global 
participation. 
 
H6:  The more grievances a person has, the more likely they are to participate in 
their tenant association.  However, after controlling for variation among people in 
their social ties and length of residence, the net effect of the accumulation of 
grievances should be substantially reduced.  This is because we expect that (a) 
grievance levels are positively related to both social ties and length of residence, 
and (b) both social ties and length of residence should have a positive effect on 
tenant association participation (H2 and H3). 
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Resources and Constraints 
Even if people have grievances, they still might not participate unless they have 
some resources that enable them to participate and they are not constrained by their job, 
family responsibilities, or physical mobility problems.  Past research has shown that the 
“biographical availability” related to such things as a person’s employment status, marital 
status, and family responsibilities can affect participation (McAdam, 1986). 
 Turning first to resources, the key resources that can influence tenant association 
participation are education, time, and money.  Education is an important resource because 
it purportedly supplies people with various skills and knowledge such as knowing the 
“rules of the game” and how to deal with public officials (Lawless & Fox, 2001; Oliver, 
1984; Rice & Steele, 2001; Wilson & Musick, 1997).  Without these skills and 
knowledge the costs of participation are higher for people with low levels of education 
(Oliver, 1984; Tjerandsen, 1980).  Because civic participation is a time-intensive activity, 
the more time someone has the more likely they are to participate in civic organizations.  
The amount of discretionary time available to someone for civic engagement is a function 
of two opportunity costs: how much they work and how many children they have (Oliver, 
1984; Putnam, 2000; Wilson & Musick, 1997).  Finally, many organizations depend on 
the dues and contributions from their members.  If tenants feel that they are obligated to 
contribute money in order to participate in a tenant association, those with less monetary 
resources should be less likely to participate.  
Turning to constraints, we expect that physical mobility problems constrain civic 
participation.  Children can be a constraint to the extent that they impose childcare 
responsibilities that make it more difficult for people to devote their time and energy to 
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community organizations.  Those with fewer or no children or children of older ages are, 
conversely, more likely to participate (McAdam, 1996; Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991).   
Olsen et al. (1989) found that the one of the most important predictors of 
neighborhood association participation is what they call socioeconomic statuses and what 
we term resources, such as home ownership, household income, occupational status, and 
education.  Perkins, Brown, and Taylor (1996) also found that resources such as income 
are positively related to civic participation.  Reingold’s (1995) study found that 
households with children were more and not less likely to participate in civic 
organizations.  This effect is explained in terms of the social ties parents develop with 
other parents through contact with local institutions such as schools and childcare 
providers.  
Though most prior studies find that resources increase and constraints decrease 
participation, Lawless and Fox’s (2001) study found that constraints might lead to 
participation among the poor.  We suspect that their findings could be indicative of a 
grievance effect instead of a resource or constraint effect.  Net of the grievances that 
those with less resources are likely to have, we expect that lack of resources will inhibit 
and not facilitate participation.   
Overall, we expect that such resources as education, income, and time (resulting 
from not working full-time) will have a positive effect on tenant association participation.  
In contrast, constraints such as disabilities, old age, and caring for children should 
decrease participation.  The central mechanism at work, we believe, is the global 
participation mechanism.  Resources increase a person’s overall potential to be involved 
in a variety of civic organizations, while constraints inhibit that capacity.  Because those 
with resources are more participatory, they are more likely to participate in their tenant 
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association, while those with more constraints are less likely to be involved in their tenant 
association because they are constrained in their ability to participate in anything.  As 
such we hypothesize that:   
H7:  The more resources a person has, the more likely they are to participate in 
their tenant association.  However, after controlling for variation among people in 
their tendency to participate in civic organizations, the net effects of resources 
should be substantially reduced.  This is because we expect that resources affect 
tenant association participation primarily through their effects on global 
participation. 
 
H8:  The more constraints a person has, the less likely they are to participate in 
their tenant association.  However, after controlling for variation in the tendency 
to participate in civic organizations, the net effects of constraints should be 
substantially reduced.  This is because we expect that constraints affect tenant 
association participation primarily through their effects on global participation. 
 
Resources and constraints may not just reflect availability and ability; they may 
also be related to social networks.  This may explain the contradictory findings 
concerning the presence of children.  On one hand, children, especially younger children, 
are a constraint because time must be devoted to their care.  On the other hand, people 
with children are more likely to have social ties to others, especially parents of their 
children’s friends (Reingold, 1995).  Because such local social networks can serve as 
recruiting mechanisms, the presence of children could have a positive effect on tenant 
association participation.  As such we expect: 
H9:  Controlling for the expected lower levels of global participation among those 
with children, those with children should be more likely to participate in their 
tenant association.  This net positive effect of children on participation should, 
however, be substantially reduced when we control for social ties.  This is 
because we expect that the presence of children also affects tenant association 
through the social network mechanism. 
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Efficacy 
Efficacy is a state of mind or feeling that a person has about their ability to stand 
up for their rights and influence important outcomes in their life (Boardman & Robert, 
2000; Nolan & Whelan, 2000; Ross, Mirowsky & Pribesh, 2001; Smith, 1994; 
Tjerandsen, 1980).  Efficacy is higher when people believe that through their own actions 
they can influence things (internal efficacy) and/or that the system is amenable to change 
and outside influence (external efficacy) (Craig, 1979; Zimmerman & Rappaport, 1988).  
People with low levels of efficacy are less likely to think that what they do is going to 
make a difference and, therefore, they are less likely to participate in associations 
(McAdam & Paulsen, 1993).   
Very few studies have directly examined the effect of efficacy on participation. 
Perkins, Brown, and Taylor (1996) found that efficacy is positively related to 
participation in community organizations in the three metropolitan cities included in their 
study.  However, most studies look at political activism and the extent to which poor 
people are more or less politically active, assuming that activism indicates that people 
feel that they can, through their actions, change things.  
The standard view in much of the literature on poor people is that they are less 
political active and appear apathetic because they have more pressing problems given 
their lack of material resources, the social disorganization of poor neighborhoods, and 
their concern for their basic survival needs (O’Brien, 1974). O’Brien, however, takes 
issue with this line of argument by claiming, using a rational choice theoretical 
perspective, that the reason the poor are less politically active is not because they are 
apathetic but because poor neighborhoods tend to fall victim to a public goods dilemma.  
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In such neighborhoods there are limited incentives that can induce poor people to 
participate and to overcome the free rider problem. According to O’Brien it is this public 
goods problem, which is poorly understood by those who would wish to increase poor 
people’s participation, and not low levels of efficacy that explains the low level of 
neighborhood association participation among the poor. 
Lawless and Fox (2001) found that among the poor, contact with government or 
street-level officials such as social service workers and police officers is as important as 
resources and constraints in explaining their political participation (whether they will 
vote or engage in protest activity) and levels of efficacy. Different encounters with 
different public officials have different political outcomes. For instance, negative 
experiences with some front-line public servants such as social service workers leads to 
lower levels of political participation while negative interactions with other public 
officials such as police officers can lead to higher levels of political participation. 
Lawless and Fox argue that this may be due to varying expectations among the poor 
about different types of government officials.      
Part of the difficulty in disentangling the relationship between poverty, efficacy, 
and political participation may be due to contextual effects.  Boardman and Robert 
(2000), using hierarchical linear modeling techniques, find that living in a neighborhood 
with high levels of unemployment and dependency on public assistance negatively 
affects people’s sense of efficacy independently of their own socio-economic status.  This 
negative neighborhood effect on efficacy may be the consequence of higher levels of 
social isolation found in poorer neighborhoods in which people are less likely to live with 
another adult who is employed or college-educated (Tigges, Browne, & Green, 1998). 
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Though neighborhood effects on efficacy probably exist, our focus is on people 
who all reside in public housing, that is, in neighborhoods that have high levels of 
unemployment and welfare dependency.  Within this population we expect that, 
controlling for individual resource levels, those with a stronger sense of efficacy will be 
more likely to participate in their tenant association.  We expect efficacy will increase 
participation because of the global participation mechanism.  Like with resources, people 
with higher levels of efficacy are more likely to participate in a variety of civic 
organizations and not just in their neighborhood or tenant association.  We, therefore, 
hypothesize: 
H10:  The higher a person’s sense of efficacy, the more likely they are to 
participate in their tenant association.  However, after controlling for variation 
among people in their tendency to participate in civic organizations, the net effect 
of efficacy should be substantially reduced.  This is because we expect that 
efficacy affects tenant association participation primarily through its effect on 
global participation. 
DATA AND METHODS 
To assess which of these possible determinants of participation among public 
housing tenants are important and why, we use data from the Multi-City Study of Urban 
Inequality (MCSUI), a multistage stratified, clustered-area probability sample of 8916 
households conducted in four major metropolitan cities–Detroit, Atlanta, Los Angeles, 
and Boston between 1992 to 1994.  For the purposes of this analysis we only use data 
from Los Angeles and Boston because important questions were omitted in Detroit and 
Atlanta.  Detroit respondents were not asked whether they lived in public housing at the 
time the study was carried out and Atlanta respondents were not asked about their 
participation in various community organizations.  So the analysis is restricted to the 648 
respondents who reported that they currently lived in public housing in Boston (N = 453) 
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and Los Angeles (N = 195).  The between-city difference in the sample sizes is the result 
of the fact that the public housing stock in Boston (over 8,000 units) is twice that of Los 
Angeles.  
Because the MCSUI employed a complex sampling design we weighted the data.  
For descriptive statistics we use individual expansion weights that yield estimates of the 
population totals for adults subject to corrections for non-response and deviations from 
the relative race/ethnicity distributions given in the 1990 Census.  When estimating the 
standard errors of our models’ parameters, we take into account design effects resulting 
from cluster sampling by estimating robust standard errors using the cluster option 
available in STATA.   
Civic Participation 
Respondents were asked the following: “Now we would like to know something 
about the groups and organizations to which you belong.  I will read a list of different 
types of organizations, please tell me if you attended one or more of their meetings in the 
last twelve months.”  The list of organizations included neighborhood, tenant’s group or 
block associations; PTA or school related groups; social clubs or sports teams; political 
organizations; church-related groups; and ethnic or cultural organizations.  
Two variables were constructed from these indicators of participation.  The first 
variable is our primary dependent variable, a measure of participation in tenant 
organizations.  It is coded 1 if a respondent attended a neighborhood, tenant group, or 
block association meeting during the past 12 months. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
 
1 Los Angeles respondents were also asked about participation in business or professional organizations, 
but because Boston respondents were not asked about this form of participation we do not incorporate it 
into our participation measures.  
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study, tenant association participation is operationally defined as attendance at a meeting 
of a tenant organization in the last year.  It would be useful to know more about levels of 
participation other than mere attendance such as whether or not tenants actively 
participate by taking on a committee or leadership role (Arnstein, 1969; Murphy & 
Cunningham, 2003).  Unfortunately these data only contain information on meeting 
attendance.  Nevertheless, we believe that this variable captures differences in this 
population between non-participants and participates.  As noted in Table 1, 18% of public 
housing tenants reported attending at least one such meeting in the last year.  
[Table 1 About Here] 
The second measure of participation is constructed in order to control for 
variation within this population in the overall tendency to participate in community 
organizations.  As noted earlier, one mechanism through which a factor could affect 
tenant association participation is by that factor affecting global participation. Our 
measure of global participation is constructed from the five additional participation items 
concerning respondents’ attendance at meetings of social/sports clubs, political 
organizations, ethnic/cultural associations, church-related groups, and school-related 
organizations.  This measure indicates the proportion of the five areas in which the 
respondent participated.  In this sample, respondents participated in about 15% of the 
 
2 For the purposes of this paper the terms “tenant association,” “neighborhood association” and “block 
association” are used synonymously. A tenant association is an organization whose members are tenants 
who rent their dwellings and reside in a delimited geographical area.  Typically the potential members of a 
tenant association all have the same landlord.  Such associations seek to promote the social and physical 
well being of their living place through the holding of tenant meetings.  Neighborhood and block 
associations are organizations whose members can include a mixture of homeowners and renters (tenants).    
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organizations that they reported information about, which equates to participation on 
average in about .75 associations.    
Global participation and tenant association participation are linked.  We view 
global participation as an indicator of participatory types of people.  We expect that such 
participatory types will be more likely to participate in their tenant associations.  This is 
why in our models global participation levels are hypothesized to be an important 
mediating factor. 
Grievances 
Whether or not people participate in tenant associations depends on how they 
perceive their neighborhood as a place to live.  People vary in the extent to which they 
perceive that there are neighborhood problems.  We assume that those who perceive more 
problems are more aggrieved about the situation in which they live.  In our study 
information on grievances comes from two questions.  In the first set, respondents were 
asked about their views on the quality of four city services: police protection, public 
schools, neighborhood shopping, and banks and lending institutions.  In the second set, 
respondents were asked about the neighborhood problems having to do with three items:  
city services (street cleaning, refuge collection, etc.), housing and property upkeep, and 
crime and vandalism.  We recorded all items so that higher scores indicate that a person 
was more upset about the service or situation. Then we took the average of the seven item 
scores (which range from 0 to 3) in order to create a continuous overall grievance 
 
3 Initially we examined whether participation in specific types of community organizations affects 
participation in tenant organizations, but the effects for each of the five types of organizations were small 
and insignificant.  However when we compute our summary measure of the overall extent of participation 
we find that it is significantly related to participation in tenant organizations, as we expected.  
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measure.   We also created a local grievance measure, which is the average of the three 
residential grievances:  housing upkeep, crime, and city services (such as garbage 
collection and road maintenance).   
Resources and Constraints 
Constraints/resources is a latent variable with four indicators: presence or absence 
of children in a household, work status, education, and per capita household income. 
Present work status has six categories: working full-time, working part-time, retired, 
disabled, out of labor force, and unemployed.  In the regressions, working full-time is the 
reference category.  Education has three categories: no high school or GED, high school 
or GED, and some college education.  No high school or GED is the omitted category.  
Per capita household income is a continuous variable measured in dollars.    By dividing 
actual household income by household size, per capita household income better captures 
 
4  Technically we took the average of those items that did not have missing data.  If a respondent had 
missing data on 4 or more the items they received a missing data value on our grievance measure. 
5 We also had another “resource” variable in our model – whether a person received welfare benefits.  
However because receipt of welfare receipt is collinear with per capita household income, we omitted this 
variable from our models.  
6  Household income was originally coded as a categorical variable in this data set.  We recoded it into a 
continuous variable using the mid-point of each income range in order to make it more meaningful to 
interpret.   For the 38 cases with missing income data we used mean substitution. We then divided 
household income by household size to compute per capita household income.  In so doing we are 
controlling for household size and using an income measure that better. 
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the resources a household member has that can be used for non-family related items. A 
dummy variable is used to indicate the presence or absence of children in a household.   
Thirty-eight percent of our sample does not have a high school degree or its 
equivalent, while 44% have completed high school, and only about 17% have gone on to 
obtain more education after high school.  The mean per capita household income of 
respondents is approximately $7,500.  In terms of present work status, 19% of the tenants 
indicate they are working full-time, 7% are working part-time, 20% are unemployed, 
24% are retired, 13% are disabled, and 16% are not in the labor force.  Forty-one percent 
of tenants have children living at home with them.    
In our analysis, per capital household income and education are viewed as 
resources.  Three categories of work status (working part-time, unemployed, and out of 
the labor force--in contrast to working full-time) are viewed as resources because we 
suspect that people in these categories have more disposable time.  Two of the work 
status categories, retired and disabled, are viewed as constraints.  Disabilities constrain 
physical mobility and, therefore, the ability of people to go to meetings and other 
activities.  Retirement, though it increases discretionary time, is viewed as a constraint 
because retired people are older and, therefore, on average less physically able to attend 
meetings.  Finally, as discussed earlier, the presence of children is primarily a constraint.  
However, because of the social network mechanism, children could both increase and 
decrease participation.    
 
7 Initially we used a continuous variable indicating the total number of children in the respondent’s 
household but the results indicated that it is the presence and not the number of children that is important.  
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Neighborhood Attachment 
Neighborhood attachment is a latent variable with two indicators: length of 
residency and social ties.  The length of residency variable is measured as the length of 
time the respondent has lived at their current address in continuous months.   Values on 
this variable range from one month to 35 years with a weighted mean of 74 months, a 
little over six years. The social ties variables are operationalized from a question that 
respondents were asked about the people with whom they discussed important matters 
and from a question which asked them whether each of the people they named lived in 
their neighborhood.  From this information we constructed two social tie variables.  The 
first counts the total number of social ties ranging from 0 to 3.   Public housing tenants 
 
8 This variable is constructed from a question that asked respondents about how long they lived at their 
current address.  Respondents were asked to specify this in months and/or in years. Alternatively, 
respondents could reply “all my life.”  In the case of the six respondents that did so, eighteen was 
subtracted from their age to compute the length of time they had lived in public housing and were eligible 
to participate in a tenant association.   
9 Respondents were asked “who are the people, other than people living in your household, with who you 
discussed matter important to you?”  If they names fewer than three people they were asked if there was 
anyone else.  For the purposes of this paper the size of their social network is the number of people that 
they named in answer to this question.   
10 Because 68 Boston respondents over the age of 65 were not asked about their social ties, we gave them 
the mean number of ties held by those aged 65 and over in the Los Angeles sample. The assumption is that 
the mean network size by age category does not vary between Boston and Los Angeles.  With the exception 
of the 54-65 age category this is true, so we feel fairly confident in our solution to this missing data 
problem.  We did, however, rerun analyses using other methods such as substituting  the mean for the entire 
Los Angeles sample, the mean for the entire Boston sample, and the overall mean, but the significance of 
the social ties variable was essentially unchanged.   
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have on average about 1.35 social ties.  The second measure distinguishes between: (1) 
those with ties, some of which are to those in their neighborhood (32%); (2) those with 
ties, none of which are to people in their neighborhood (22%), and; (3) those with no 
social ties (46%).   
Efficacy 
We would have preferred a measure of locus of control or some other social-
psychological measure of efficacy, but these data do not contain such information.  
Instead we include a proxy for efficacy, whether or not a respondent is registered to vote.  
The assumption is that those who are registered are also high in efficacy because 
registering to vote indicates that they believe that their actions, in this case voting, can 
make a difference.   
However, because 18% of our sample could not register to vote because they were 
not born in the US and have not become US citizens, we cannot just include in our 
models a measure of whether a person is registered to vote.  Therefore, in the analysis we 
distinguish three groups:  non-citizens who cannot register to vote (18%), citizens who 
are registered to vote (60%), and citizens who are not registered to vote (22%).  We 
include two dummy variables in our models, one for non-citizens and one for citizens 
who have registered to vote, with the reference group being citizens who have not 
registered.  This way we are able to ascertain whether citizens who are registered are 
more likely to participate than citizens who are not registered.   
 
11   For this variable, we assumed that respondents who were aged 65 or over in the Boston sample had no 
social ties because we don’t know either whether they have ties or who the ties are to. We also 
experimented with another variable indicating respondents’ total number of neighborhood ties, but results 
indicated that just distinguishing between those with and without neighborhood ties was sufficient. 
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Demographic and Background Variables 
Table 1 also contains the descriptive statistics on the demographic and 
background variables that we control for in the analyses.  The weighted mean age of the 
respondents is about 47 years.  The sample is disproportionately female (57%), African 
American (37%), and Hispanic (26%).  The never married category accounts for 24% of 
the sample.   
The sample of public housing tenants in this study is broadly similar to the 
samples used by Taube and Levin (1971), Venkatesh (2000), Reingold (1995), Gotham 
and Brumley (2002), and Vale (1997).  The public housing universe tends to be over-
represented by females, minorities, and welfare recipients (Holzman, 1996).  
To control for age and sex, measures of sex (a binary variable with females coded 
as 1 and males as 0) and age measured in continuous years are included in the model.  
We also include age squared in the models in order to test for curvilinear age effects.  The 
race of respondents (three dummy variables with black as the reference category) is 
included in order control for the possibility of racial differences in tenant participation.  
Previous research suggests that church attendance and marital status also affect 
neighborhood association participation (Reingold, 1995).  To control for these factors, we 
add to the model a marital status variable (four dummy variables with never married as 
the reference category), and a measure of church attendance. Our measure of church 
attendance is a continuous variable with values ranging from 0 (never goes to church) to 
4 (attends church once a week or more). We also initially included a set of dummy 
variables for religious affiliation, but because these variables were not significant they are 
omitted.   
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Ideally we should also control for contextual factors such as the type of public 
housing and the characteristics of tenant associations.  Civic participation is not just a 
function of individual-level traits such as grievances, resources and constraints, networks 
and attachment, and efficacy.  People are also more likely to participate when they have 
the opportunity to participate.  The existence of a tenant association, the extent of its 
presence, and its accessibility within a housing development may impact participation.  
Unfortunately, the MCSUI lacks information on these contextual factors.  The only 
contextual factor that we do have information on is city. We control for city in order to 
control for variation between Boston and Los Angeles in the history of tenant 
associations within the public housing systems and the different opportunities those 
histories may have produced. 
Because we lack measures of contextual opportunity factors (with the exception 
of city) we are assuming that public housing tenants have similar opportunities to 
participate in a tenant association.  This assumption would be violated if, for example, 
there was significant nonrandom variation across public housing developments in the 
presence of tenant associations.  While we have no data to justify our assumption of 
similar opportunities, we think this assumption is justified.  We believe that one way 
public housing authorities mandate participation is by creating tenant associations at 
public housing sites.  We expect, therefore, that most public housing developments have, 
at least formally, a tenant association that creates the opportunity for their tenants to 
 
12 Technically the assumption is that variation in the opportunities to participate are not associated with our 
measures of attachments, grievances, resources, constraints and efficacy.  If opportunities vary at random 
or if opportunities are the same across all settings, then any measures of opportunity would not be 
associated with our independent variables.  
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participate.  But because authorities do not require membership and participation as a 
condition of residence, there is, as we shall see, variation in the extent to which tenants 
do in fact participate.  It is this variation that we are attempting to explain.    
RESULTS 
We proceed by estimating a series of models designed to assess the impact of the 
independent variables on tenant association participation and the mechanisms through 
which they have their impacts.  We use the logistic regression routines in STATA to 
estimate our models.  All models include these control variables:  age, age2, sex, marital 
status, race, church attendance, and city. Each of the first four models includes one set of 
predictors. Models 1a and 1b includes our measures of neighborhood attachment, Model 
2 our measure of grievances, Model 3 the measures of resources and constraints, and 
Model 4 our measure of efficacy.  Model 5 is the full model and includes all the 
independent variables.  Finally, Model 6 includes our measure of overall (global) 
participation and allows us to ascertain whether the independent variables affect tenant 
association participation after controlling for their effects on tenant association 
participation via overall participation.   The estimated parameters in all these models 
gauge the log-odds of attending a tenant association meeting that results from a one unit 
change in the independent variable.  For dummy independent variables, the predicted 
change is relative to the omitted reference category.  
Neighborhood Attachment 
Table 2 contains the parameter estimates for each of the models.  Models 1a and 
1b test the neighborhood attachment hypotheses.  In Model 1a we contrast people who 
have neighborhood ties and people who have ties but not to neighbors with those who 
have no ties.  People with either type of ties are more likely to attend a tenant association 
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meeting.  In addition, those that have resided longer in the public housing development 
are also more likely to participate.  The difference between the two tie estimates in Model 
1a is not significant. Therefore, we collapse the two categories together in Model 1b and 
just estimate the effect of having social ties irrespective of the character of those ties. 
[Table 2 About Here] 
We also experimented with a continuous measure of social ties but it did not 
improve the fit of the model.  There are no differences in participation for those with one, 
two, or three social ties.  We also constructed a measure of the proportion of total ties that 
are neighborhood-based ties, but it too is not significant.  For attending tenant association 
meetings, it appears that it is just the presence of social ties and not the number of ties nor 
their type (neighborhood or not) that is important.  Those with ties are about 140% more 
likely to attend a tenant association meeting than those with no ties.   
In Models 1a and 1b the estimated for the effect of length of residency is 
significant and positive.  An additional year of residency increases the odds of 
participating by about 5%.  As such those who have resided in the public housing 
development for 10 years are about 62% more likely to attend a tenant meeting than those 
who have just arrived.
 
13 Because logistic regression models are multiplicative, the anti-log of the parameter estimates presented in 
Table 2 indicate how much the odds of participating are increased or decreased for a unit change in the 
independent variable.  For continuous variables you can also compute the change in the odds for a greater 
than 1 unit change in the independent variable.  In the case of longevity which is measure in months, a 1 
year increase yields a 1.049 (= e(12*.004)) increase in the odds, while a 10 year difference yields a 1.62 (= 
e(120*.004)) increase in the odds. 
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In order to ascertain how and why social ties and longevity affect participation we 
turn to Models 5 and 6.  In Model 5 we control for the other expected determinants of 
participation, while in Model 6 we also control for global participation (i.e., the number 
of other civic organizations besides a tenant association in which a person participates).  
As expected (H3) the effect of longevity is basically unchanged, indicating that 
longevity’s effect is direct (the local participation mechanism).   
The effect of social ties is a bit more complex.  In Model 5 the social ties effect is 
basically unchanged compared to Model 1b (.817 versus .867) indicating that the effect 
of ties is independent of the other factors in the model.  However, in Model 6 the social 
ties effect is reduced, though it is still positive and statistically significant at the .05 level.  
This indicates that some of the effect of social ties is indirect via social ties’ effect on 
global participation.  The effect of social ties on global participation is shown in Table 3 
where the parameter estimates from an OLS regression of global participation are 
presented.  Social ties has a positive net effect on global participation, and because global 
participation strongly affects tenant association participation (see Model 6, Table 2), 
social ties has an indirect effect on such participation.  While we expected this indirect 
effect through global participation (H2), we did not expect a residual direct effect for 
social ties in general.  Instead we expected only neighborhood ties to directly effect 
tenant association participation (H1). However, as we have seen, there is no difference in 
the effects of neighborhood and non-neighborhood ties.  Ties, no matter who they are to, 
affect neighborhood participation both through the global participation and the local 
participation mechanisms.  
[Table 3 About Here] 
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The strong effects of neighborhood attachment could indicate that there are two 
subpopulations among public housing tenants:  settlers who view their current public 
housing dwelling as a near permanent place of residence and sojourners who see public 
housing as a temporary way station on their way to other housing.  Settlers put down 
roots in public housing developments and develop ties with others.  Because of their 
commitment to where they live, they have more of a stake in the place and are less likely 
to leave, resulting in longer residencies.  Because public housing is seen as a permanent 
home and because they have more social ties, they are more likely to be drawn into 
participating in their tenant association.  In contrast, because sojourners expect to leave, 
they are less likely to develop social ties, to have a stake in the neighborhood, and, 
therefore, to participate in tenant associations. 
Grievances 
Model 2  in Table 2 contains the estimate for the effect of grievances.  As 
expected those with more grievances are more likely to attend a tenant association 
meeting.  Initially we thought that some grievances would be more important predictors 
so we estimated models with dummy variable indicators for each of the seven grievances.  
Results not shown here indicated that none of the specific grievances relating to city 
services and neighborhood problems are significant by themselves. We also computed a 
grievance measure using the three grievances that are most related to the local 
neighborhood–housing upkeep, crime, and city services. Results not reported here 
indicate that that measure is also not significant. The implication is that it is the 
accumulation of various types of grievances rather a specific grievance or specific set of 
grievances that leads to participation.  
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Models 5 and 6 allow us to ascertain whether the effect of grievances persists 
when we control for other factors.  As shown in Model 5, the effect of grievances is 
reduced when we control for the other determinants of participation and is no longer 
significant.  According to H6, the decreased significance of grievances should be the 
result of the association of grievances and neighborhood attachment.  Those with network 
ties are more likely to have grievances, and there is a positive correlation between length 
of residency and grievances (r = .167).  Therefore, we estimated a combined model that 
includes the grievance measure and the two measures of neighborhood attachment, ties 
and longevity. The results reported in Table 4 in the column labeled Models 1 and 2 show 
that the grievance effect (.283) is not significant.  This finding supports H6.  The 
grievance effect is reduced when we control for variation in ties and longevity.    
[Table 4 About Here] 
Whether social ties and longer residencies lead to more grievances, or whether 
grievances lead to forming ties and staying longer is something we cannot ascertain with 
these data.  What is clear is that the effect of grievances on participation is really an 
attachment effect and not per se a grievance effect.  
Further evidence that there is no net direct grievance effect is evident in Model 6 
of Table 2 that includes the global participation measure.  Controlling for global 
participation (whose effect is highly significant as one would expect) further reduces the 
net grievance effect from .373 in Model 5 to .067 in Model 6.  Even if there is some net 
effect of grievances after controlling for attachment, that effect disappears when we 
control for global participation. 
The explanation for this substantial decrease in the grievance effect is found in 
Table 3 that reports the effects of our variables on global participation.  As one can see, 
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grievances have a significant and positive effect on global participation, even with 
controls for social ties and length of residency.  The implication is that grievances also 
affect tenant association participation through their effect on global participation, a 
finding that is consistent with H5. 
In sum, we find that contrary to H4, local grievances do not increase tenant 
association participation.  Only overall grievances affect tenant association participation 
but not directly.  Rather it is because grievances are positively associated with social ties 
and longevity and because grievances positively affect global participation that 
grievances are related to tenant association participation.
The lack of a direct net effect of grievances led us to suspect that there could be 
interactions between grievances and other factors, especially resources.  As resource 
mobilization theories have noted (Tilly, 1978), grievances may be a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for collective action.  Only when aggrieved people are able to 
participate, will they in fact participate.  Therefore we examined whether grievances had 
an effect on participation among those who had more resources.  Interactions with our 
resource variables (education, per capita household income, and work status) were 
however not significant.   
 
14  The lack of a direct net effect of grievances led us to suspect that there could be interactions between 
grievances and other factors, especially resources.  As resource mobilization theories have noted (Tilly, 
1978), grievances may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for collective action.  Only when 
aggrieved people are able to participate, will they in fact participate.  Therefore we examined whether 
grievances had an effect on participation among those who had more resources.  Interactions with our 
resource variables (education, per capita household income, and work status) were however not significant.  
We conclude, therefore, that in this population it is the indirect effects of grievances that are important and 
not interaction effects.   
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Though grievances do not have a direct net effect on tenant association 
participation, this does not mean that they are unimportant.  On the contrary, grievances 
are important.  People residing in public housing who have more grievances are more 
active and involved in their community.  Because of their greater overall participation 
levels and their social ties they are also more likely to participate in specific civic 
organizations such as tenant associations.  As such grievances have a more general and 
diffuse effect on participation.  The accumulation of grievances does not dispose people 
to participate in specific organizations.  Rather grievances lead people to be more 
involved in general.   
Resources and Constraints 
To recap, the important resources are education, money, and time, while the 
constraints are disabilities, retirement, and having children.  Contrary to prior 
expectations only one of the resource factors, having a high school degree and having 
some college education (in contrast to those without a high school degree), is significant 
and only one of the constraint variables, presence of children, is statistically significance 
(see Model 3, Table 2).  Both those who have graduated from high school and those with 
a college degree are over 80% more likely to participate than those who have not 
graduated from high school.  The coefficients for the two education dummy variables are 
very similar in value, indicating that it is the completing high school versus dropping out 
contrast that is crucial.  
According to H7, resource effects should be the result of the global participation 
mechanism.  Results from Models 5 and 6 appear to confirm that expectation.  
Controlling for other factors, the educational contrasts are still positive, though only the 
high school versus dropout contrast is statistically significant.  However, after controlling 
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for global participation in Model 6, neither educational contrast is significantly different 
from zero.  Education increases tenant association participation, but it does so by 
increasing a person’s overall participation activity. 
The other resource measures, per capita household income, and the three work 
status contrasts that are indicative of having more disposable time are never significant.  
In this population, variation in these resources is not an important determinant of 
participation in tenant organizations.  A plausible explanation for the absence of resource 
effects is that public housing tenants are a relatively homogenous, resource-poor 
population with few full-time employed persons and low incomes.  The one resource 
variable that does differentiate people within this population (education) is also the only 
resource variable that affects participation in this population. 
Turning to the constraint variables, contrary to H8, neither the disability nor the 
retirement contrasts are statistically significant.  The only constraint variable that is 
significant is the presence of children in the household and contrary to expectations its 
sign is positive.  People with children are over twice as likely to be involved in their 
tenant association than people with no children living at home.   
In order to explore the effect of children, we examined the relationship between 
children being present and both social ties and longevity.  Having children is negatively 
related to longevity and positively related to social ties.  Those with children have resided 
about two and half years less in their public housing development.  Approximately 63% 
of those with children have social ties, while 45% of those without children have ties.   
The implication is that the presence of children affects tenant association participation in 
two opposing ways.  The presence of children increases social ties, which increases 
participation, while having children decreases the length of residency that leads to a 
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decrease in participation.  This is why when we control for these counterbalancing forces, 
the children coefficient’s value does not change very much (compare Models 3 and 5).   
But what about the positive net effect of children?  This effect appears to be the 
result of the positive effect that having children has on global participation.  Those with 
children are more active in their communities.  So when we control for global 
participation (Model 6 in Table 2) when analyzing the odds of participating in a tenant 
association, the children effect is substantially reduced and is no longer significant. The 
presence of children increases tenant association participation, but it does so by 
increasing a parent’s overall participation activity. 
In sum, population resources and constraints are less important determinants of 
tenant association participation.  Only one resource, education, affects tenant association 
participation and it does so indirectly by increasing more educated people’s overall 
tendency to be involved.  None of the constraint variables are important except the 
presence of children, and that variable does not act like a constraint.  While the effect is 
positive, the three ways in which the presence of children impact tenant association 
participation appear to have little to do with constraints.  Instead the presence of children 
promotes both global participation and local participation through social ties to others.  
The negative effect children have on tenant participation is indirect; the result of those 
with children having shorter stays in public housing.  People with children probably view 
their stay in public housing as temporary and are, therefore, less likely to get involved in 
their local tenant association, though social ties formed while there can mitigate this 
tendency.  Even if social ties do not compensate for the negative effect on participation 
that results from short durations, this does not mean that parents with children are less 
involved in their communities.  They may not be as involved as others in tenant 
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associations (because they do not plan to stay long), but as the results from Table 3 show, 
they are more likely to be involved in other types of civic organizations.   
Efficacy 
Model 4 tests the efficacy expectation by looking at the effect of being registered 
to vote.  Citizens who are registered to vote are over two and half times more likely to 
attend tenant association meetings than citizens who are not registered.  Non-citizens 
(who cannot vote) and citizens who are not registered to vote (the reference group) do not 
differ in their participation rates.  Both these groups are less likely to participate in their 
tenant association than the purportedly more efficacious feeling citizens who are 
registered to vote.  The efficacy effect does not appear to be a social network effect.  
While those who are registered to vote are somewhat more likely to have social ties than 
those who are not, the effect of being registered to vote is still statistically significant 
even with controls for social ties and other factors in Model 5.   However, the efficacy 
effect is the result of the global participation mechanism (H10).  More efficacious people, 
as measured by those who are registered to vote, are more involved in civic organizations 
(see regression results in Table 3) and are more likely to participate in their tenant 
association.  Therefore, as seen in Model 6 of Table 2, there is no net efficacy effect 
when we control for global participation. 
 
15 The registered to vote effect does decrease from Model 4 to 5 but this appears to not be due to attachment 
and networks.  In Table 4 we report results from a model that includes the attachment variables and the 
efficacy measures.  While the registered to vote coefficient is a bit smaller compared to Model 4 in Table 2, 
it is still quite large and statistically significant.   
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Control Variables 
The effects of the control variables on participation for Models 5 and 6 are 
reported in Table 5.   Five control variables are significant: female, age, Los Angeles, 
church attendance, and divorce/separated.  The positive female effect on tenant 
association participation appears to be the result of women being more involved in 
general in their communities.  We are unsure why women are more involved than men, 
but given the previously discussed effects of children we suspect that it has something to 
do with sex differences in time spent at social reproductive work such as child rearing 
and housework (Feldman & Stall, 2004).  Other studies such as Lawson and Barton’s 
(1990) study of the tenant movement in New York City found that initially women were 
more likely to be followers than leaders of tenant unions because of institutional 
discrimination against women. However, over time women are likely to move into 
leadership positions once they learn the skills of grassroots organizing and develop social 
ties with important power nodes. While we find this sex difference to be intriguing and 
worthy of further study, unpacking it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
[Table 5 About Here] 
Turning to the effect of age, results indicate that participation increases with age. 
While in Models 5 and 6 the age-squared effect is not significant, it is significant in a 
model that contains only the control variables (results not reported here).  However, when 
we control for work status and, in particular, retirement, the age-squared effect is no 
longer significant.  The implication is that participation increases with age up to a point 
and then begins to decline.  This curvilinear age effect is probably due to effects that 
 
16 We only report the parameter estimates for Models 5 and 6. The estimates do not change much in Models 
1-4.  
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make people less active and mobile as they age.  Given these results, the highest level of 
participation is found among middle-aged people who because of their life course stage 
have more at stake and, therefore, are more likely to participate. 
Both the church attendance and the separated/divorced effects are significant and 
negative in Model 6, but not statistically significant in Model 5 (see Table 5), suggesting 
that a suppressor effect is at work.  Results not shown here indicate that both these factors 
increase global participation, but as shown in Model 6 of Table 5, after controlling for 
global participation, both factors decrease tenant association participation.  This direct 
negative effect could indicate the presence of tradeoffs resulting from time commitments.   
For some subpopulations of public housing tenants, participation in other civic 
organizations (which usually increases participation in tenant associations) could 
decrease their participation rates in their tenant association.  Therefore, for churchgoers 
and divorcees the direct negative effect on tenant association participation resulting from 
a time tradeoff is suppressed by the indirect positive effect of divorce and church 
attendance via global participation.   
Finally, the negative Los Angeles effect could be the result of a number of factors.  
The public housing population could be different in Los Angeles, though we have 
controlled for a range of demographic variables such as race/ethnicity and immigrant 
status.  The way in which public housing is organized in Los Angeles as compared to 
Boston could also make tenant participation more difficult.  Alternatively, Los Angeles 
may have fewer active tenant associations so the opportunity to participate is more 
limited compared to Boston.  Finally, the housing stock is likely to be different in these 
two communities because Boston is older and has more extensive public housing. Poorer 
housing and critical masses of tenants could increase participation in Boston.  The fact 
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that participation rates vary geographically implies that differences in opportunities 
across places could be an important determinant of participation.    
DISCUSSION 
These findings indicate that attachments, grievances, a sense of efficacy, and to a 
lesser extent, resources and grievances are determinants of public housing tenants’ odds 
of participating in their tenant association.  However, how these factors affect 
participation varies.  The global participation mechanism is important in understanding 
how grievances, efficacy, and one resource–education–impact participation.  Grievances, 
efficacy, and education increase a person’s overall participation level and, therefore, their 
participation in their tenant association.  Grievances also affect participation through the 
social network mechanism, as does the presence of children.  Because those with children 
and those with more grievances are more likely to have social ties to others, they are 
more likely to be involved in their tenant association.  Finally, the local participation 
mechanism is important in understanding the effects of social ties and length of 
residency.  The positive direct net effects of both these factors indicate that they increase 
the odds of tenant association participation directly and not just through other factors.  
These findings not only shed some new light on the determinants of tenant association 
participation, but they also raise some important research questions. 
First, researchers interested in understanding civic participation and collective 
action need to revisit their views on the role grievances play.  It appears that it is the 
accumulation of grievances and not any specific grievance or even grievances directly 
related to specific issues (in this case public housing issues) that is important in 
explaining participation.  Furthermore, this accumulation of grievances increases tenant 
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association participation by increasing people’s overall tendency to be involved in their 
communities.  Grievances set the stage for public housing tenants getting involved in 
their associations by making them more prone to participate in civic life.  
Second, neighborhood attachment matters.  People who have lived longer at their 
current residence and who have more social ties are more likely to participate.  The 
importance of attachments built by social ties cannot be understated.  Ties affect tenant 
association participation in two ways.  First, ties increase people’s overall level of civic 
participation and, as a result, their tendency to be involved in their local association.  
Second, ties directly increase participation in tenant associations, most likely through 
people’s contacts informing them about and recruiting them into the association.  Future 
research on civic participation needs to explore the central role networks play in civic 
participation.  Because of both the direct and indirect effects of social ties on specific 
forms of participation, networks can and often are an important mechanism through 
which other factors lead to participation in specific civic organizations.   
We suspect that part of the reason attachment based on longevity increases 
participation is that tenants who reside longer in public housing are more likely to 
accumulate social ties to people already involved in the tenant association.  However, 
even after controlling for social ties, longevity has a positive net effect on tenant 
association participation.  There are many reasons why people who have resided longer in 
a place are likely to be more involved, net of the networks they have formed.  Longevity 
increases the stakes one has in one’s residential area, awareness of opportunities to 
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participate, interests related to community issues, and the frames through which they 
view their community (Small, 2002).
Third, within this relatively poor population, variation in resources such as 
available time and money is not as important as we expected.  Among these relatively 
poor public housing tenants, people do in fact participate, even though they lack the 
resources that purportedly facilitates participation.  This non-finding implies that 
resources may not be as important as some theories of collective action and civic 
participation would lead us to believe.  Of course attending tenant association meetings is 
a relatively low cost form of civic participation.  Types of participation that require more 
sacrifices may be more a function of resources.   
The one resource that does matter, education, increases tenant association 
participation indirectly.  Education appears to operate as an enabler providing people 
with the skills and self-assurance needed to take part in public affairs.  However, the 
education effect could also be the result of exclusionary practices of civic associations 
that look down upon and stigmatize those with limited amounts of education (Wuthnow, 
 
17 Those with longer stays in a place are also more likely to have developed a “neighborhood narrative” 
(Small, 2002) that tells them that staying rather than leaving represents the best means of optimizing one’s 
life chances. Consider, for instance, Small’s (2002) study of local participation in a Latino housing project. 
Small argues that people’s “neighborhood frames” or orientations to their living place vary according to 
their history in it.  People that have been long time residents of a neighborhood tend to have a better 
knowledge of its history and collective memory.  Newly arrived residents, on the other hand, tend to lack 
this knowledge of a neighborhood’s collective memory and so invest less meaning or significance in it.  For 
newcomers, the desire for upward mobility (which in all likelihood entails leaving public housing) trumps 
their desire to contribute to their public housing community. 
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2002).  Such educational elitism could create disincentives for those with less education 
to participate.    
Fourth, there is no evidence in this population that constraints inhibit 
participation.  In fact, one of our purported constraint variables, the presence of children 
in the household, increases instead of decreases tenant association participation because 
having children leads to social ties and increases global participation.  The only negative 
effect of children that we detected is not the result of child caring constraints.  Instead 
people with children tend to move on sooner, leading, all things considered, to less 
participation in their local association.  Therefore, future research needs to examine the 
multiple ways in which variation in household composition affects not just people’s 
overall involvement in their communities but also the specific types of civic 
organizations in which they are likely to be involved. 
Fifth, like with grievances and education, efficacy disposes people to be more 
involved in their community and, therefore, also in their tenant associations.  The fact 
that we found an efficacy effect, even with our crude measure, indicates that even in this 
relatively poor population residing in a relatively poor locale, there is variation in 
efficacy and those with more efficacy (as indicated by their registering to vote) are more 
likely to be involved in civic life.  We expect that with better social-psychological 
measures of such things as locus of control, the efficacy effect would be even stronger.   
Finally, this research has focused on the individual-level determinants of 
participation.  While our results show that individual differences among tenants in 
grievances, attachments, education, and efficacy are important, we realize that contextual 
factors may also play an important role.  In particular we suspect that the characteristics 
of tenant associations themselves could affect participation rates.  Tenant associations 
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differ from one another along a range of dimensions such as how long they have been 
active, their relationship to other organizations and the wider community (Kingston, 
Mitchell, Florin, & Stevenson, 1999; Mesch & Schwirian, 1996; Monti, 1989; 
Tjerandsen, 1980), the extent of local housing authority support for them (Monti, 1989), 
racial and ethnic representativeness (Fahey, 1999), and the quality of tenant leadership 
(Monti, 1989; Tjerandsen, 1980).   
Future research needs to examine these contextual factors for three reasons.  First, 
the opportunity to participate may vary across places.  Some places may have thriving 
tenant associations, while in other places they may not even exist.   Second, participation 
may be influenced by the perceived inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the tenant 
organization, which in turn may be related to how similar or different association 
members are to a prospective member.  In particular, the racial composition of tenant 
organizations in a racially diverse public housing development could influence tenants’ 
comfort level and, therefore, their decision to attend association meetings.  Third, the 
traits of public housing developments such as population density (high versus low), 
building type (high-rise versus other), ownership (public versus subsidized/private), 
quality of housing unit, and type of unit (family versus senior citizen, clustered versus 
scattered-site housing) could make it easier or harder to organize a tenant association and 
attract participants (Amick & Kviz, 1975; Bickford & Massey, 1991; Garshick Kleit, 
2001; Greenberg & Rohe, 1984).   
 
18 Furthermore, if people are more likely to have grievances when a tenant association exist, grievance 
effects could really be opportunity effects.  
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CONCLUSION 
The notion that participation in groups and organizations is a good thing for the 
individual and the community and that it operates as an antidote to anomie is as old as 
sociology itself (Portes, 1998).  This study looks at one special type of associational 
involvement in a sample of public housing tenants.  Our purpose is to identify the factors 
that account for variation in neighborhood association participation among public 
housing residents and increase our understanding of how those factors affect 
participation.  The findings suggest that the factors that predict tenant participation are 
not that different from the factors that predict civic participation generally.  Therefore, 
there does not appear to be something unique or distinctive about tenant participation as 
we might have expected.  Tenants who are more participatory are more likely to have 
grievances, to have a sense of their own power, to have lived for a long time in their 
current neighborhood, and to have social ties to others.  To be sure, public housing 
residents have other characteristics that distinguish them from other populations such as 
low levels of education and limited economic resources.  But the evidence indicates that 
being resource-poor does not constrain one’s willingness or ability to participate in tenant 
associations. Rather the picture is one of a resource-poor population in which grievances, 
efficacy, and attachments stimulate participation and involvement in civic life generally.   
Additionally, we argue that scholars and policy makers should be attentive to the 
fact that public housing developments are not as socially disorganized as they are often 
assumed to be (Vale, 2000).  Policy documents and the media often portray the urban 
poor as social isolate, contrasting them with the home owning, stable middle class.  But 
in some respects the social distance between public housing tenants and homeowners 
may not be as great as pundits and politicians portray.  Almost 20% of tenants in the 
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present study attended a tenant organization meeting in the last 12 months.  That one in 
five tenants participate is remarkable and suggests that public housing is not an aberration 
but is a fertile ground for even more participation.  Indeed, public housing tenants may in 
fact be more participatory than residents in private housing (see Olsen et al., 1989 who 
report a 9% participation rate among people residing in private housing; see also 
Reingold, 1995).   
Though participation levels are not low in this population, they could be even 
higher.  The responsibility for increasing participation often falls to local housing 
authorities and at the street-level community organizers.   Authorities and organizers 
need to consider not only which strategies for increasing participation will be more 
effective, but also how they want to go about increasing participation.  Based on the three 
mechanisms that we identified (the global participation, local participation, and social 
network mechanism) we highlight three strategies.  
First, using the global participation mechanism, organizers could increase 
participation in a specific civic organization like a tenant association by increasing 
people’s overall tendency to be more involved in their community.  Three factors in our 
analysis work this way:  grievances, efficacy and education.  Local organizers can 
heighten grievances indirectly by increasing people’s awareness of the issues and 
problems that affect their lives through public meetings that provide tenants with 
information about and contacts with organizations in the local community.  Increasing 
grievances by increasing awareness is also likely to increase people’s social ties to other 
people, further enhancing participation.  This is probably why awareness efforts can have 
such a huge payoff.  They not only activate overall involvement, but they also facilitate 
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the formation of social networks, which create connections to people in specific civic 
associations.    
Local authorities and organizers could also increase tenant’s global participation 
rates by empowering tenants.  Our research highlights the importance of two enablers:  a 
sense of efficacy and education.  Efficacy could be increased by small successes through 
which tenants see that their efforts make a difference.  To the extent that education is an 
enabler, increasing educational attainment through adult education programs could 
increase participation by giving people the skills, knowledge, and confidence they need to 
express themselves in public.  On the other hand, to the extent that education’s effect is 
the result of educational elitism within tenant associations, local authorities need to 
counter the exclusion that results from this elitism by, for example, recruiting people with 
low levels of education as tenant leaders and reorganizing meetings so that those with 
more education do not dominate discussions. 
Alternatively, using the local participation mechanism, authorities and organizers 
could focus their efforts upon increasing participation in the local tenant association.  Our 
results indicate that an effective way to do this is by increasing the probability that a 
tenant will stay longer in a public housing development.  Longevity could be increased in 
several ways:  (1) by upgrading the quality of public housing; (2) by offering ownership 
rights to dwellings; and, (3) by decreasing the negatives sometimes found in public 
housing such as poor services, ineffective management, and anti-social behavior 
problems. By pursuing these objectives, authorities could increase people’s stake in their 
residences and in turn their participation in the local community.   
However, attempts to convert potential sojourners into settlers by making public 
housing more attractive raises questions about whether public housing is designed to be a 
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permanent home for those who can not afford private sector housing or a form of 
transition housing for the poor.  Can public housing authorities make public housing 
attractive and thereby increase commitment among tenants to their place of residence 
while at the same time they are promoting public housing as a transitory form of 
accommodation?  At some point the goals of increasing attachment and participation 
could come into conflict with public housing being a temporary source of housing for 
those in need.  
Finally, because of the importance of social networks for both local and global 
participation, local authorities and organizers could increase participation by helping 
tenants develop social ties.  Of course authorities and organizers cannot directly create 
ties for tenants.  People create ties to others based on their interests, needs, and many 
other factors.  But authorities and organizers can do things that are conducive to the 
formation of ties by creating spaces, situations, and activities that allow tenants to interact 
with one another.  Such facilitation may be most important for tenants without children 
given that the presence of children already is conducive to the formation of social 
networks.   
Though our findings suggest some strategies that could increase tenant association 
participation, if we really want to help those involved in public housing increase 
participation, we need to directly study the mechanisms and processes through which 
participation is affected.  We have highlighted in this article three mechanisms: (1) the 
global participation mechanism linked to grievances and enablers such as education and a 
sense of efficacy, (2) the local participation mechanism linked to longevity which 
increases people’s stake in the places that they live, and (3) the social network 
mechanism through which social ties to others lead to information about and recruitment 
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into civic organizations.  But it is difficult to really know how grievances, attachment, 
social networks, efficacy, and education affect participation without direct observation of 
what goes on in public housing developments.  Ethnographic research could, for 
example, illuminate and help us understand differences within this population that our 
quantitative research has detected as important, e.g., the differences between sojourners 
and settlers and those with and without a high school degree.  We see our research as 
providing new insights that can help social scientists and practitioners better understand 
the social lives of those who are less fortunate.  Ultimately, we hope this research both 
debunks misconceptions about and stimulates more research on the civil society that poor 
people create through their civic participation.     
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TABLE 1 
Weighted Descriptive Statistics (N = 648) 
 
Variable Proportion/Mean Standard 
Error 
Demographic/Background Variables: 
  
Age 46.928 1.831 
Sex (1 = female) .57  
Marital status:   
Married  .27  
Separated/Divorced .25  
Never Married .24  
Widowed .15  
Cohabiting .05  
Race:   
White .30  
Black .37  
Hispanic .26  
Other .06  
Church attendance 2.203 .145 
Religious affiliation:   
Catholic .36  
Protestant .54  
Other religion .04  
No religion .04  
Participation:   
Overall (global) participation .15  
Tenant association participation .18  
Grievances: 
  
Level of grievances 2.114 .066 
Local grievances 3.126 .086 
Resources/Constraints: 
  
Education:   
No high school .38  
High school .44  
Some college .17  
Work status:   
Full-time work .19  
Part-time work .07  
Retired .24  
Unemployed .20  
Disabled .13  
Not in the labor force .16  
Per capita household income 7539.818 1113.523 
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Presence of children .41  
Neighborhood Attachment: 
  
Length of residency (in months) 74.187 12.207 
Number of ties 1.353 .156 
Type of ties:   
 Neighborhood ties .32  
 Non-Neighborhood ties .22  
 No ties .46  
Efficacy:   
Citizen registered to vote  .60  
Citizen not registered to vote .22  
Non-citizen .18  
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TABLE 2 
Effects for Models of Attendance at Public Housing Tenant Association Meetings  
Without global participation (Models 1 through 5) and with global participation 
(Model 6). 
 
   Model     
 1a 1b 2 3 4 5 6 
Grievances:        
  Level of grievances   .445* 
(.205) 
  .373 
(.249) 
.067 
(.283) 
Constraint/Resources:        
  Working part-time    .715 
(.497) 
 .621 
(.495) 
.704 
(.633) 
  Disabled    .220 
(.410) 
 .249 
(.425) 
.592 
(.569) 
  Retired    -.888 
(.631) 
 -.865 
(.619) 
-.913 
(.752) 
  Out of labor force    .393 
(.422) 
 .439 
(.437) 
.812 
(.545) 
  Unemployed    .611 
(.386) 
 .631 
(.415) 
.890 
(.553) 
  Per capita household income    .000 
(.000) 
 .000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
  Presence of children    .732** 
(.305) 
 .733*** 
(.317) 
.347 
(.353) 
  High school    .604*** 
(.219) 
 .540* 
(.233) 
.377 
(.274) 
  Some college    .620** 
(.274) 
 .388 
(.317) 
-.606 
(.514) 
Neighborhood Attachment:        
  Presence of ties  .867*** 
(.206) 
   .817*** 
(.227) 
.573* 
(.283) 
  Neighborhood ties .902*** 
(.228) 
      
  Non-neighborhood ties .817** 
(.261) 
      
        
  Length of residency .004** 
(.002) 
.004** 
(.002) 
   .004* 
(.002) 
.005** 
(.002) 
Efficacy:        
  Non-citizen     .348 
(.342) 
.680 
(.368) 
.134 
(.472) 
  Citizen registered to vote     .960*** 
(.261) 
.709** 
(.275) 
.565 
(.332) 
  Global participation       9.674*** 
(1.021) 
Pseudo R2 .1124 .1122 .0843 .1111 .0965 .1573 .4263 
 
Note. *p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, n = 648. All models include the following control variables: 
age, age2, sex, marital status, race, church attendance, and Los Angeles.  
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TABLE 3 
Determinants of Global Participation, Full Model 
 
 
Variable Full Model 
Grievances:  
  Level of Grievances .036* 
(.018) 
Constraint/Resources:  
  Working part-time .055 
(.039) 
  Disabled -.007 
(.026) 
  Retired -.028 
(.037) 
  Out of labor force .002 
(.024) 
  Unemployed .030 
(.025) 
  Per capita household income .000 
(.000) 
  Presence of children .052* 
(.022) 
  High school .036* 
(.016) 
  Some college .085** 
(.027) 
Neighborhood Attachment:  
  Presence of ties .041** 
(.015) 
  Length of residency .000 
(.000) 
Efficacy:  
  Non-citizen .073** 
(.021) 
  Citizen registered to vote .043* 
(.018) 
R2  .21 
 
 
Note. *p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Robust standard errors in parenthesis, n = 648. The full model of global participation 
includes the following control variables: age, age2, sex, marital status, race, church 
attendance, and Los Angeles.  
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TABLE 4 
Effects of Select Combined Models on Attendance at Public Housing Tenant 
Association Meetings (without Global Participation) 
 
  Model  
 1 and 2 1 and 3 1 and 4 
Grievances:    
  Level of Grievances .283 
(.216) 
  
Constraint/Resources:    
  Working part-time  .691 
(.480) 
 
  Disabled  .243 
(.423) 
 
  Retired  -.792 
(.627) 
 
  Out of labor force  .420 
(.435) 
 
  Unemployed  .658 
(.398) 
 
  Per capita household income  .000 
(.000) 
 
  Children  .748* 
(.316) 
 
  High school  .557* 
(.224) 
 
  Some college  .472 
(.323) 
 
Neighborhood Attachment:    
  Presence of ties .844*** 
(.206) 
.850*** 
(.217) 
.839*** 
(.218) 
  Length of residency .004** 
(.001) 
.004** 
(.001) 
 
.004* 
(.001) 
Efficacy:    
  Non-citizen   .593 
(.357) 
  Citizen registered to vote   .821** 
(.268) 
    
Pseudo R2 .1152 .1437 .1247 
 
Note. *p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, n = 648. All models include the following control 
variables: age, age2, sex, marital status, race, church attendance, and Los Angeles.  
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TABLE 5 
Effects of Control Variables on Attendance at Public Housing Tenant Association 
Meetings, Select Models 
 
Control Variable Model 5 
 
Model 6 
Age .113* 
(.046) 
.131* 
(.057) 
Age2 -.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
Female .605* 
(.272) 
.598 
(.412) 
Married .025 
(.452) 
.054 
(.526) 
Separated/Divorced 
 
-.351 
(.283) 
-.923* 
(.381) 
Cohabiting .179 
(.626) 
.159 
(.674) 
White .226 
(.412) 
-.314 
(.537) 
Hispanic -.059 
(.420) 
-.424 
(.544) 
Other .279 
(.800) 
-.380 
(.878) 
Church attendance 
 
.005 
(.077) 
-.367*** 
(.104) 
Los Angeles -1.198** 
(.393) 
-.578 
(.448) 
 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Omitted categories are: Never married, 
for marital status; Black, for race; No Religion, for religion; No High School, for 
education; Working full-time, for work status. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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